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Horvath: Empirical Study of Admissibility

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND A REVISION OF THE CONVENTIONAL
NARRATIVE IN THE TOXIC TORT CONTEXT
George Horvath
ABSTRACT
There is a generally accepted narrative about the development of the
rules governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony. In this
narrative over most of the twentieth century, the Frye rule imposed an
inflexible requirement that evidence and testimony which was generally
accepted was admissible while evidence that was not generally accepted
was not. But the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert installed
judges as the new arbiters of admissibility of expert testimony and
replaced the Frye rule with a new standard: the relevance and reliability
of the scientific evidence on which the expert witnesses rely. This
revolution (one strand of the generally-accepted narrative continues) has
allowed judges to unfairly tilt the playing field in favor of defendants—
typically large corporations—by erecting impossibly high barriers to the
admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
This Article uses an empirical analysis of fifty-seven toxic tort cases to
advance a counternarrative: The scientists were never in charge; rather,
judges have long had the upper hand. Before Daubert, scientific evidence
presented by experts was admitted in support of claims that seemed to the
judge to have merit and rejected when the case appeared to be weak,
allowing the judge to dispose of actions in the pretrial phase. The
Daubert “revolution” did nothing to alter that balance of power as judges
continue to exclude experts and dispose of cases at the evidentiary stage
with the same frequency and in the same patterns as under the Frye
standard.
The analysis does not allow a determination of the factors that underlie
post-Daubert judges’ admissibility decisions. But, whatever those factors
may be, the Daubert “revolution” has neither clearly improved the
outcomes in toxic tort cases nor ensured judges’ adherence to the existing
set of rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony and scientific
evidence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a generally accepted narrative about the development of the
rules governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony. This
narrative, in rough outline, runs as follows: There was the ancien
regime—dating back to 1923—of the Frye rule, under which judges were
required to defer to the scientific community as the arbiter of what
scientific evidence and which expert witnesses would be admitted to
testify at trial. Frye imposed an inflexible rule: evidence and testimony
that was generally accepted by the scientific community was admissible;
evidence that was not generally accepted was not. But, in 1993, the
Supreme Court prompted a revolution in its Daubert decision, which
deposed the scientific community as the arbiter of admissibility. Instead,
the Court installed judges as the new arbiters of admissibility, and
replaced the Frye rule with a new standard—the relevance and reliability
of the scientific evidence on which the expert witnesses rely. This
revolution (one strand of the generally-accepted narrative continues) has
allowed judges to unfairly tilt the playing field in favor of defendants—
typically large corporations—by erecting impossibly high barriers to the
admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
This Article uses empirical evidence derived from an analysis of fiftyseven toxic tort cases to advance a counternarrative: The reality was that
the scientists were never in charge. Complain as they might about
untruthful experts and their apparent infallibility, judges have long had
the upper hand. In cases decided before Daubert, scientific experts and
their scientific evidence were useful tools to be admitted in support of
claims that the judge deemed to have merit, and to be rejected when the
case appeared to be weak, allowing the judge to dispose of the action in
the pretrial phase. The Daubert revolution did nothing to alter that
balance of power as judges are still excluding experts and disposing of
cases at the evidentiary stage with the same frequency and in the same
patterns as under the Frye standard. But post-Daubert judges are no
longer relying on simplistic markers such as a case’s strength to guide
their admissibility decisions.
Ultimately, I conclude that judges’ decisions on the admissibility of
expert witnesses and scientific evidence have never been solely about
whether the rules of admissibility that applied at the time were satisfied;
rather, judges have been rendering, and continue to render, admissibility
decisions based on other factors. The findings of this empirical study do
not allow me to determine the factors that underlie post-Daubert judges’
admissibility decisions. But whether judges have been acting out of a
pervasive cynicism about the ability of juries to appropriately weigh
expert testimony, or out of a desire to further their own political and
ideological agendas, or out of some other motive, judges have not been
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playing by the rules in regards to admitting scientific evidence. While I
will not argue that a results-oriented approach to admissibility rulings is
unacceptable in all circumstances, I will argue that as currently practiced,
judges’ rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony and scientific
evidence have been a failure from both a results-oriented and a processoriented perspective.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the conventional
narrative, along with a more robust history of the rules governing the
admissibility of expert witness testimony and scientific evidence. This
discussion will show that the conventional narrative is incomplete in
many places. Part II focuses on the requirements that a plaintiff
advancing a toxic tort claim must meet in order to show why an analysis
of toxic tort cases may be useful in elucidating judges’ actual
admissibility practices. Part III presents the findings of the empirical
study that was conducted by the author which shows that the conventional
narrative is not only incomplete, but also incorrect in many places. Part
IV proposes a counternarrative to the traditional narrative that takes into
account both the more complete history presented in Part I and the results
of the empirical study. Part IV also discuss areas of promise for the work
of scholars who want to understand what judges are actually doing in
toxic tort cases when they render admissibility rulings on scientific
evidence and expert witnesses.
II. OF INFALLIBLE LIARS AND FRUSTRATED JUDGES
How do courts handle expert witnesses and scientific evidence? This
question—and its next of kin: how should courts handle expert witnesses
and scientific evidence?—has long bedeviled plaintiffs and defendants,
commentators, Congress, and most importantly, courts themselves. In
1874, Judge William Lawrence Foster repeated the words of a
contemporary trial attorney, who in a closing argument said that “there
are three kinds of liars,—the common liar, the d—d liar, and the scientific
expert.”1 The judge’s frustration was understandable. Recounting a New
Hampshire case over which he presided in 1874, he noted that three
experts had testified that blood cells, when deposited onto clothing, may
be “restored to perfect shape” after a period of ten years, while two other
experts had testified that such a transformation was possible only after
two weeks.2 Judicial attitudes toward experts has changed little since the
nineteenth century; Judge Jack Weinstein has recently stated that “[a]n
expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any theory, no matter
1. William L. Foster, Expert Testimony,—Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11
HARV. L. REV. 169, 169 (1897). The elision is Judge Foster’s.
2. Id. at 172.
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how frivolous.”3 In anonymous surveys, federal district court judges
identified the most significant problem with expert witness testimony as
being that experts too often “abandon objectivity and become advocates
for the side that hired them.”4
If the problem were limited to the availability of experts willing to
testify on demand to any theory, it would be of minor importance. The
availability of experts bearing opposing opinions and the power of crossexamination would minimize the experts’ impact. But, a pervasive
concern of the legal system is that the veneer of scientific objectivity will
lead to unquestioning acceptance of scientific evidence by juries. One
court described the power of scientific evidence as being so great that
“scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen.”5 Similar concerns attach to
the experts who would testify at trials.
These concerns lend themselves to the creation of a “judges versus
experts” trope which underlies the conventional narrative about the
development of the rules of admissibility of expert witness testimony and
scientific evidence. The apparent conflict between judges and experts has
only grown more severe with time. Science has advanced dramatically,
and scientific knowledge has moved farther and farther from the
understanding of laymen jurors.6 As a result, the balance of power is said
to have shifted even further in favor of the experts, whose ability to
interpret the incomprehensible arcana of science is seemingly necessary
to help the jury make correct decisions.7
The conventional narrative regarding the admissibility of scientific
experts and testimony assumes that the rules of evidence governing the
admissibility of expert testimony and scientific evidence have long served
the purpose of balancing the competing interests of expert witnesses (and
the parties on whose behalf they testify, and the lawyers who pay their
fees) with those of judges and the validity of the adversarial process that
they oversee. Under the ancien regime,8 i.e., the Frye rule, judges had to
defer to the scientific community as the arbiter of what scientific evidence
3. ROGER C. PARK & RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 85 (12th ed.
2013) (quoting Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989).
4. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding
Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328 tbl.6 (2002).
5. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Baller,
519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Because of its apparent objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific
basis is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.”).
6. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA
42-43 (1995) (outlining the history of the role of science and scientific experts in legal cases).
7. Id. at 43.
8. The ancien regime analogy was drawn by Professor David L. Faigman in a recent law review
article. See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 907 (2013).
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and which expert witnesses would be admissible to testify. The Frye rule
was inflexible—evidence that was generally accepted had to be admitted.
The judges’ hands were tied. But, beginning in 1993, the Supreme Court
prompted a revolution in its decisions that form the “Daubert trilogy”9
which removed the scientific community as the arbiter of admissibility,
replacing it with judges as the new arbiters. The Daubert trilogy also
rejected the Frye rule for a flexible new standard: the relevance and
reliability of the scientific evidence on which the expert witnesses rely.
Although it is not universally accepted, the narrative of the revolutionary
impact of the trilogy is constantly retold by judges,10 by commentators,11
and—showing the narrative’s general acceptance—in textbooks.12
Scholars have extended the conventional narrative to argue that
modern-day judges are using their gatekeeping powers under Daubert to
pursue various goals that are not permitted under the current rules. Some
argue that the Daubert revolution has allowed judges to unfairly tilt the
playing field in favor of defendants by erecting impossibly high barriers
to the admissibility of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. This tilt favors large
corporations and represents a retreat by courts from the project of
protecting consumers. Others argue that judges make admissibility
rulings and dispose of cases in conformity with their political and
ideological leanings. Others further argue that judges’ decisions are
motivated by a desire to avoid reversal by appellate courts.
Section A of this Part provides a background on the rules of evidence
that courts and Congress have developed over the past ninety years to deal
with scientific evidence and experts. This history discusses the test
9. The “Daubert trilogy” consists of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999). See Part II.A, infra.
10. See e.g., Berger, infra note 133, at 290 (reporting the results of a Federal Judicial Center study
in which judges assessed their admissibility decision as having changed significantly after Daubert).
11. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 8, at 907 (“Daubert . . . marked a sea change and gave to courts
the core instrument of the enlightenment, the scientific method. Daubert constituted a frontal assault on
the Ancien Regime, thus giving birth to modernity in the law's use of expertise.”); Lucinda M. Finley,
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to
Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2000) (“Vigorously exercising their role as
evidentiary ‘gatekeepers’—a task assigned to them by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.—federal trial judges in products liability cases have been doing far
more than screening proposed expert testimony to determine admissibility. The Daubert gatekeeper power
has become a potent tool of tort lawmaking.”); Cf. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A
National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 433, 435-36 (2001) (discussing only Frye and Daubert in a review of the development of the
rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony and scientific evidence). But see Joseph Sanders,
Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 78 (2009) (“The so-called
Daubert revolution has pushed courts in the United States toward a slightly more inquisitorial posture.”).
12. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 664 (5th ed. 2011) (“It is
not too much to say that Daubert has prompted a revolution in the manner in which expert testimony is
being treated by the lower courts.”).
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established in Frye v. United States13 and the alternative tests that
developed in response to that decision, the 1975 adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,14 and concludes with a discussion of the seminal 1993
case of Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals15 and the two
subsequent cases that form the “Daubert Trilogy.” Section B then
discusses recent scholarly literature that has theorized what judges have
actually been doing in the Daubert era.
A. The Rules: From Frye to the Daubert Trilogy
1. The Frye Rule
Surprisingly, the rule that governed the admissibility of expert
testimony and scientific evidence for most of the twentieth century was
established neither by Congress nor by the Supreme Court; instead, the
Frye rule was developed in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Subsection a describes the Frye rule and the limitations that
courts and commentators complained the rule created. Then Subsection
b discusses some of the mechanisms that courts developed in an attempt
to escape those limitations.
a. The Frye Rule and Its Discontents
The test enunciated in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia’s 1923 Frye v. United States decision has been described as the
“general acceptance” test.16 In Frye, the court was presented with a
defendant charged with murder who had confessed but subsequently
recanted.17 The defendant sought to admit evidence of his innocence in
the form of an expert who would testify that results from a forerunner of
the modern polygraph test established the defendant’s innocence.18 In
evaluating the admissibility of this “new” form of evidence,19 the court
noted that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
17. C.T. McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 484, 499 n.49
(1927).
18. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
19. Professor McCormick’s 1927 article concludes that by the time Frye was decided, physiologic
disturbance tests (such as measuring blood pressure changes in response to questions) had been generally
accepted as scientifically valid by psychologists. Supra note 17, at 503.
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the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.20
Although the Frye test was never—until the Daubert decision—
challenged at the Supreme Court, it “dominated the admissibility of
scientific evidence” in both federal and state courts for seventy years.21
The Frye test conditioned the admissibility of expert testimony on the
general acceptance by the scientific community of the data or technique
on which an expert relied. The Frye court’s brief opinion did not address
two key issues, however: First, it did not address how a court is to
determine when a technique has been generally accepted by the relevant
scientific community. Second, it did not address how—or even
whether—a court should evaluate an expert’s use of the technique or data
in formulating an opinion.
The Frye test was criticized on general grounds as being too rigid.22
Much of the specific criticism leveled at the test concerned what judges
and commentators saw as the test’s tendency to exclude too much
scientific evidence and too many scientific techniques for too long.23
Some commentators argued that the time required for a new technique or
theory to obtain general acceptance “deprive[d] courts of reliable
evidence.”24 Judges themselves struggled with the straitjacket that the
general acceptance test imposed. One judge, confronted with a case in
which an anesthesiologist was suspected of murdering his wife by
injecting her with the anesthetic drug succinylcholine—which was not
detectable by conventional tests in 1968—rejected the delay inherent in
the general acceptance rule, writing that “[s]ociety need not tolerate
homicide until there develops a body of medical literature about some
particular lethal agent.”25 He concurred that evidence of the presence of
succinylcholine in the murder victim, which had been generated by a
novel test developed by the medical examiner—evidence that should have
been excluded under the Frye general acceptance rule—had been properly

20. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
21. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 & n.47 (1980).
22. Id. at 1223.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (Mann, J., concurring
specially).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss2/4

8

Horvath: Empirical Study of Admissibility

2020]

EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ADMISSIBILITY

523

admitted by the trial judge.26 Even proponents of the rule admitted that it
“retard[ed] somewhat the admission of proof based on new methods of
scientific investigation.”27
Other courts struggled with the rigidity of the Frye rule in the opposite
context, where the rule would have required admitting expert testimony
that was generally accepted. Courts in criminal cases found “a strong
countervailing” reason to limit the state’s expert testimony: “the
defendant's right to a fair trial.”28 Thus, despite its surface inflexibility,
the Frye general acceptance rule may have been circumvented by judges
to exclude scientific evidence where they feared that such evidence would
“assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen,”
and thus result in unfairness to a criminal defendant.29
Although the goal of assuring a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial
is vital, so is the goal of not allowing murderers to go free while awaiting
general acceptance. Cloaking decisions based on fairness in the mantle of
an objective evidentiary rule thus raises a problem: when judges conflate
evidentiary standards and burdens of proof, they are making decisions that
may be dispositive of cases using means that are, at best, opaque. It seems
likely that even in the straitjacketed Frye era, judges had been crossing a
line, moving into the realm of projecting their sense of the overall merits
of the cases before them onto specific evidentiary rulings.
b. Pre-Federal Rules Alternatives to the Frye Rule
Courts and commentators struggled with the general acceptance test,
finding it to be over- and underinclusive, difficult to apply, and focused
on the wrong consideration.30 Even though no alternative standard gained
widespread acceptance, two other standards were developed. However,
a review of the case law from before the Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted shows that neither test was widely accepted, and that courts never
defined standards for these tests. Thus, courts generally avoided the
strictures of the Frye test on an ad hoc basis.
Looking back from 1980, Professor Paul Giannelli described a
“traditional” approach to admissibility that he called the “relevancy
approach”31 as an alternative to the Frye test. He noted that, in 1954,
26. Id.
27. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Giannelli, supra note 21,
at 1248 n.380 (describing other cases in which courts considered the prosecution’s overall burden of proof
when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence).
29. Addison, 498 F.2d at 744.
30. See Giannelli, supra note 21, at 1223-25 (discussing problems of overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness).
31. Giannelli, supra note 21, at 1232-33.
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Professor Charles McCormick had written that general acceptance is not
a “criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.”32 Instead,
McCormick insisted that “[a]ny relevant conclusions which are supported
by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other
reasons for exclusion.”33 The criteria under the relevancy approach
included the qualifications of the expert witness and relevancy of the
expert’s conclusions, with the extent of the scientific community’s
acceptance of the underlying theory or technique being merely an issue
of the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence.34
Case law contemporary with McCormick’s 1954 textbook, and indeed
case law predating the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, does
not show that the relevancy approach was widely accepted or that the
terms of the approach were well defined. In the 1954 case State v.
Olivas,35 the Arizona Supreme Court heard a challenge to the trial court’s
admission of the results of a “drunkometer” test36 that allegedly showed
the defendant to be legally intoxicated.37 In rejecting the defendant’s
challenge based on the existence of “scientific disagreement” over the
accuracy of the test, the court held that “scientific disagreement affects
only the weight and not the admissibility of evidence.”38 Olivas has been
cited as a case applying a rule that all relevant evidence should go to the
jury.39 It is not clear, however, that Olivas actually rejected general
acceptance as the sine qua non of admissibility of scientific evidence. The
court, in its brief opinion, rejected only a “lack of unanimity” standard.40
However, under the Frye formulation of general acceptance, unanimity is
not necessarily required. At most, then, Olivas stands for a rejection of
the most stringent possible interpretation of Frye.41
Coppolino v. State,42 decided in 1968, appears to be the last major case
cited in support of the relevancy approach before the advent of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In Coppolino, a medical examiner devised a novel
test for detecting the presence of succinylcholine, a drug that induces

32. Id. at 1233 (quoting McCormick, Evidence 363-64 (1954)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1233 and n.280.
35. State v. Olivas, 267 P.2d 893 (Ariz. 1954).
36. The drunkometer was an early version of the modern-day Breathalyzer. See State v. Warren,
252 P.2d 781, 783 (Ariz. 1953), for a discussion of the device and its use.
37. Olivas, 276 P.2d at 894.
38. Id.
39. See Giannelli, supra note 21, at 1233 n.276.
40. Olivas, 276 P.2d at 894.
41. See also People v. Bobczyk, 99 N.E.2d 567, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951); McKay v. State, 235
S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950) (“In all probability a scientist may be found who will disagree
with practically every generally accepted scientific theory.”).
42. Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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paralysis and which is not found in the human body.43 The examiner
determined that traces of succinylcholine were present in the body of a
deceased woman, forming the basis of the examiner’s testimony in the
woman’s murder trial.44 Coppolino differed from the earlier cases in that,
unlike the Drunkometer, the medical examiner’s test had never been
performed before; thus, there existed no body of scientific literature on
the test and no degree of acceptance of the test in the forensic science
community.45 Nonetheless, the Florida appellate court held that the trial
judge had not abused his discretion in admitting the evidence because he
had “listened to the testimony of the expert witnesses and in an exercise
of his discretion ruled that the tests in question were sufficiently reliable
to justify their admission.”46
It is difficult to extract from these cases a relevancy standard; in fact,
Coppolino seems to apply a reliability standard instead of a relevance
standard. A review of these court opinions and academic commentaries
does show, however, that during the Frye era, there were judges and
commentators who advocated for the use of relevance (however
determined) as the standard for admissibility, while there were others who
advocated for the use of reliability (however determined) as means of
escaping the rigidity of Frye’s general acceptance test.
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence
This Section reviews the Federal Rules of Evidence, focusing on Rule
702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Then, this
Section discusses some of the complaints that courts and commentators
raised to the perceived ease with which expert testimony was admitted,
and the court’s responses to these complaints.
a. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Bias in Favor of Admissibility
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, are generally “biased
in favor of admissibility” of evidence.47 Under Section 402, any relevant
evidence is admissible, unless barred by the Constitution, federal statute,
another section of the Federal Rules, or a rule promulgated by the
Supreme Court.48 Relevance is given a broad definition in Section 401:
43. Id. at 69 (“[The medical examiner] ‘testified that some of his tests and procedures were
standard ones and that some were new.’”).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 70-71.
46. Id. at 71.
47. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 13 (2d. ed. 2006).
48. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
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“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.”49 Thus, there is no minimum
quantum of evidence required for relevance; any tendency, no matter how
small, to make a fact more or less likely, satisfies Rule 401.50 Likewise,
a piece of evidence, even if it relates far more directly to other matters, is
relevant if it bears even slightly on a fact in question.51
The original version of Rule 702, which governed the admissibility of
expert testimony, was likewise biased in favor of admissibility: “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”52
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules reflect the
intention of the drafters that Rule 702 be broadly interpreted, noting
specifically that expert testimony was not limited to opinions, that
expertise is not limited to scientific and technical topics, and that experts
include those who have experience, but not an advanced degree, in a
field.53 In fact, the topic of the expert’s testimony need not have been
beyond the average juror’s comprehension; testimony was admissible if
it would help jurors understand material even if the material was such that
was difficult but which the jury could ultimately understand.54
Focusing solely on the language of Rule 702, there would seem to be
no place left for the Frye general acceptance test. But the assumption that
the Federal Rules had superseded Frye was far from generally accepted.
The advisory committee notes, congressional committee reports, floor
debates, and hearings—the vast bulk of the legislative history—were all
silent on the impact of the Rules on Frye.55 Several commentators
believed that “[i]t would be odd if the Advisory Committee and the
Congress intended to overrule the vast majority of cases . . . without
explicitly stating so.”56 In essence, these writers applied the maxim of

49. FED. R. EVID. 401.
50. See id., Avisory Committee Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules (noting that “[a]ny more stringent
requirement is unworkable and unrealistic”).
51. Id.
52. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2000). The current version of Rule 702 incorporates the
Supreme Court holdings in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s
notes to the 2000 Amendments.
53. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules.
54. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd Cir. 1985) (quoting S. SALTZBURG
& K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 451 (3d ed. 1982)).
55. See Giannelli, supra note 21, at 1229.
56. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234 (reviewing writings of Saltzburg & Redden, Louisell & Mueller,
and Giannelli).
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statutory construction that holds a statute “in derogation of the common
law . . . is to be strictly considered.”57 Some federal, and many state,
courts thus continued to apply the Frye general acceptance test long after
the adoption of the Federal Rules.58
Others, however, saw the Federal Rules’ silence on Frye as being
“tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard.”59
Indeed, the overall structure of the Rules supports this contention. Rule
702 requires only that expert testimony be helpful.60 Rule 402 requires
that any relevant evidence be admitted,61 while Rule 401 defines
relevance as having any tendency to make a fact more or less likely.62
Nowhere do the rules mention general acceptance.
The lower courts struggled with this lack of clarity. In United States v.
Downing, the Third Circuit wrote that the “status of the Frye test under
Rule 702 is somewhat uncertain.”63 Nonetheless, the court went on to say
that “a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the
scientific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
admissibility.”64 It is difficult to conceive of a more clear rejection of the
Frye test. The court set out a three factor test of its own, under which a
district court would evaluate:
(1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in
generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the
evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the
proffered connection between the scientific research or test result to
be presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the case.65
This so called “Downing test” became the Third Circuit rule in criminal
and civil cases.66 Other courts attempted to harmonize the Federal Rules
and the Frye test.67
57. Devers v. Scranton City, 161 A. 540, 542 (Pa. 1932).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1199 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J.
concurring); United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Evidence based on a novel
scientific technique is admissible if it is generally accepted as a reliable technique among the scientific
community.”).
59. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234 (quoting J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE).
60. FED. R. EVID. 702.
61. FED. R. EVID. 401.
62. FED. R. EVID. 402.
63. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232.
64. Id. at 1237.
65. Id.
66. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that district court
erred in application of Downing test in toxic tort case); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that district court erred under Downing test in excluding defendant’s proffered expert
testimony).
67. See Amy T. Schutz, Note, The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye
World, 72 N.C.L. REV. 1060, 1075-76 (1994).
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In addition to establishing admissibility requirements for scientific
evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence also prescribe minimal
restrictions on the qualifications for expert witnesses. Rule 702 states
only that “[a] witness . . . is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.”68 The 1972 Advisory Committee
Notes to the proposed rules indicated that the intention of the Rules was
to provided broad latitude in the definition of an expert: “[W]ithin the
scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word,
e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group
sometimes called ‘skilled’ witnesses, such as bankers or landowners
testifying to land values.”69 Under the Federal Rules, courts thus have
broad latitude to decide whether an expert’s particular knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education qualifies them to testify on the
particular matter at issue as an expert.70
Rule 702 does not specify how closely a proffered expert’s knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education must relate to the issues on which
they would testify. Courts applying Rule 702 generally held a permissive
attitude toward admitting experts who possessed expertise somewhat
related to the point on which they were proffered to testify; they did not
require an expert to possess expertise precisely on point.71 “[Expert
witnesses were] not strictly confined to [their] area[s] of practice, but may
testify concerning related applications; a lack of specialization affects the
weight of the opinion, not its admissibility.”72 This “[l]iberality and
flexibility in evaluating qualifications”73 was based on an assumption that
someone who has related expertise “can . . . make himself very much an
expert in the particular [area].”74 Thus, in terms of both experts’
qualifications and the content of their testimony, the Federal Rules
establish a strong presumption in favor of admissibility.
b. The Bias in Favor of Admissibility and the Junk Science Hysteria
Concerns over the impact of the permissive approach that the Federal
Rules of Evidence take to the admissibility of expert testimony formed
68. FED. R. EVID. 702.
69. FED. R. EVID. Rule 702 advisory committee’s note.
70. See, e.g., Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd sub
nom. Lappe v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd. of Japan, 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
71. Id. at 226. See also id. at 227 n.4 (citing Gardner v. General Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525 (10th
Cir.1974); Wylie v. Ford Motor Co., 536 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.1976); Hammond v. International Harvester
Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir.1982); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.1985)).
72. Id. at 226.
73. Id. at 227.
74. Id. at 226-27 (quoting United States v. Viglia, 549 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977)).
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part of a crescendo of dissatisfaction with the court system during the
1980s and early 1990s. Over the thirty year period between 1960 and
1988, the caseload in the federal district courts trebled, and the ratio of
pending to terminated cases rose from 0.75 to 0.97, indicating that the
district courts were falling behind in their workload.75 Some academic
commentators claimed that “[t]his tremendous surge in civil litigation has
taxed our court system,” resulting in “higher product prices, higher legal
fees and costs, less access to the system for average Americans, and a less
dynamic economy.”76 In 1991, Vice President Dan Quayle delivered the
report of the President’s Council on Competitiveness (“Quayle Report”),
which claimed that the increase in litigation had resulted in direct annual
costs of $80 billion, and over $300 billion when indirect costs were
considered.77 The Quayle Report noted that in 1989, 18 million new civil
cases had been filed in state and federal courts.78
The Quayle Report sharply criticized the use of expert witnesses on
several counts. The use of contingency fees “easily turns too many expert
witnesses into ‘hired guns.’”79 And the report claimed that the ease with
which expert testimony was admitted resulted in “the ability to fashion
almost any opinion into expert testimony.”80 Criticism by commentators
of the use of expert witnesses extended to criminal cases as well.
Professor Giannelli deplored the use of “junk science” in criminal cases,
discussing, among other things, the widely-discredited testimony of a
psychiatrist in Barefoot v. Estelle that there was a “one hundred percent
and absolute” chance that the convicted murder would kill again.81
In the popular media, the “junk science” trope was widely broadcast.
Newspapers retold stories of absurd jury awards to undeserving plaintiffs,
such as the Philadelphia psychic who was awarded nearly one million
dollars because a CT scan had deprived her of her psychic powers.82 The
stories rarely were thorough—in the psychic’s case, the reported stories
rarely noted that the plaintiff had informed the medical staff that she was
allergic to intravenous contrast, which the staff had administered
75. THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 5-6 (1990).
76. Gregory Brian Butler & Brian David Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response to Dr.
Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992).
77. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 1 (1991).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id.
81. Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105,
113 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
82. See, e.g., Says Her Powers Vanished: ‘Psychic’ Awarded $988,000 in Hospital CAT Scan
Lawsuit, LA TIMES (Mar. 30, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-03-30/news/mn-1672_1_allergicreaction [https://perma.cc/6TAW-9NGT].
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nonetheless, provoking a severe reaction83—and judicial reductions in the
awards often went unreported. Magazines recounted the bizarre
“specialties” that experts claimed to possess, including “sportsology,”
which had enabled one expert to opine on the millions of dollars in
revenues a collegiate athlete lost when he was cut from his team for
academic underperformance.84 Perhaps no one was more influential than
Peter Huber, whose 1991 book, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the
Courtroom,85 popularized the term “junk science,” and served as the basis
for many of the Quayle Report’s assertions.
Within the academic world, however, scholars debated the extent, and
even the existence, of the “litigation explosion.” Professor Deborah R.
Hensler pointed out the weaknesses of the Quayle Report’s empirical
bases. According to Hensler, only two out of every hundred people
injured by accidents filed lawsuits to recover damages.86 Further, the 18
million new civil cases that the Report cited included “millions of routine
cases citizens are required to file under certain circumstances—for
example, divorce cases and probate cases,” undercutting the argument
that litigation was driving costs up and driving down American
competitiveness.87
In spite of significant pushback within the legal academy and the bar
against the Quayle Report’s conclusion that there was an ongoing
litigation explosion, the overall tenor of academic commentary on the
admissibility of expert witness testimony and scientific evidence revealed
a pervasive sense that the balance of power was tilted far too far in the
plaintiffs’ experts’ favor.88 Some judges, too, felt that the admissibility
83. Haimes v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 39 Pa. D. & C. 3d 381, 384-85 (1986).
84. Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989,
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1989/09/25/72505/ [https://perma.cc/UW684QUE].
85. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
86. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness’s Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 245-46 (1992).
87. Id. at 245.
88. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 697 (1992)
(“[T]hese observations do not augur well for the current concerns about junk science or cleaning up the
expert witness business.”); John F. Baughman, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1614 (1992) (“[T]he evils of allowing junk science to support tort verdicts are several.”);
Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 742 (1992) (“An accretion of cranks
in court follows inevitably from the great paradox of modern liability science: in attempting to control
quackery outside the courtroom, we invite quacks to the witness stand.”). But see Jeff L. Lewin,
Calabresi’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 189 (1992)
(“Huber's evaluation of the impact of junk science does not measure up to the standards of scientific
methodology.”); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1639 (1993) (describing the case against the contemporary use of expert witnesses as “a
catalog of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and,
now and again, outright fraud” (quoting HUBER, supra note 85, at 3)).
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practices were too lenient. Judge Jack Weinstein complained that “an
expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no
matter how frivolous . . . . [A]n expert's testimony can be used to
obfuscate what would otherwise be a simple case.”89 This frustration lead
one commentator to write that “[t]he liberalization of expert witness
testimony inevitably created its own backlash.”90 Some judges began
applying “stricter standards against evidence from the fringes of the
scientific community.”91 However, it is not clear how extensive this preDaubert judicial move away from the permissive approach to expert
testimony became.92
3. The Rules Under the Daubert Trilogy
In Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye’s general
acceptance test.93 In place of general acceptance, the Court held that the
Federal Rules now required trial court judges to “ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.”94
The Court located the requirement for relevance in Rule 702, which
established that scientific evidence was admissible if it would “assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”95
This is the so-called “fit” requirement—that is, the testimony had to be
sufficiently “tied to” the case that it would assist the jury.96
The Court located the reliability requirement in the clause of Rule 702
that referred to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”97
In the Court’s view, “scientific” meant that the testimony was grounded
“in the methods and procedures of science”98 and “knowledge” meant
“any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts
or accepted as truths on good grounds.”99 The key here is that “good
grounds” meant knowledge “derived by the scientific method.”100 But
89. Green, supra note 88, at 670 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U.
RICH. L. REV. 473, 475-76 (1986)).
90. Id. at 669.
91. HUBER, supra note 85, at 736.
92. See id. at 737 (“Judicial insistence on peer review is still by no means unanimous, however.”).
93. Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94. Id. at 589.
95. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
96. Id. at 591.
97. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 590.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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how were judges, untrained in the sciences, to determine whether a
technique or theory is scientific knowledge? The Court posited four
factors for consideration: (1) whether the theory or technique can be and
has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, (3) whether it has a known error rate and standards for
“controlling the technique’s operation,” and (4) whether it is generally
accepted.101
Although Daubert is considered to have revolutionized the rules of
admissibility for scientific evidence and expert testimony,102 there is very
little that is revolutionary about the four “Daubert factors.” That the
reliability factors include Frye’s general acceptance test is only part of the
story; the other three factors are merely essential conditions for general
acceptance. Very few techniques or theories will be widely accepted by
scientists if they have not been tested; testing involves evaluating the error
rate and controllability of the technique; and the medium through which
scientists communicate is publication in peer reviewed journals. So, in a
very real sense, Daubert simply broke the general acceptance test into its
subatomic particles and afforded trial judges greater flexibility. On the
one hand, judges could find that evidence was admissible even though it
had not yet achieved general acceptance, as where a technique or theory
had been tested and published through the peer review process. On the
other hand, judges could exclude evidence that was generally accepted if
they determined that the other factors were absent. Of course, as just
noted, if a theory or technique had been generally accepted, it was a
practical necessity that scientists in the field had determined that the other
factors were present. To contradict this determination of scientists in the
field, judges would be, as Justice Rehnquist warned in his partial dissent,
playing the role of “amateur scientists.”103
It is this last possibility, which arises from the shift in judicial attitude
demanded by Daubert, that is generally accepted to be the truly
revolutionary outcome of the decision.104 The conventional narrative is
that before Daubert, judges took a deferential approach to scientific
evidence and experts; that is, the scientific community, not the trial judge,
was empowered to determine what evidence was admissible.105 After
Daubert, it was the trial judge, not the scientific community, who would
101. Id. at 593-94.
102. See e.g., Marc S. Klein, Daubert: Worldwide Judicial Management of Humanity's Specialized
Knowledge, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1997) (describing Daubert’s “revolutionary effect”).
103. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., partial dissent).
104. Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the
Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 Law and Contemp. Probs.
289, 293 (2001) (noting that Daubert thrust judges into the position of defining scientific knowledge).
105. Ronald J. Allen & Esfand Nafisi, Daubert and Its Discontents, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 134
(2010).
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determine whether evidence was reliable and relevant, and hence,
admissible. But this story does not hold true for all areas of the law;
ironically, it does not hold true for the very area of the law out of which
Daubert arose: toxic tort litigation.106
The Court continued to develop its jurisprudence concerning expert
witness testimony and scientific evidence in its 1997 General Electric Co.
v. Joiner decision.107 In Joiner, the Court established two important
points. First, the Court assigned trial judges an additional responsibility
of determining whether the expert’s inferences, even though drawn on
reliable and relevant knowledge that passes the Daubert test, were
themselves products of a reliable scientific method. At trial, the district
court judge had excluded Joiner’s proffered expert witness testimony that
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) can cause small cell lung cancer.108
Finding that the expert opinion was inadmissible because it was based on
animal studies, and on human epidemiological data that failed to
demonstrate a correlation between exposure and lung cancer, the Supreme
Court held that “a court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”109 Joiner thus
appears to have tipped the balance struck by the rules and the Court’s
decisions between judges and experts farther toward the judges,
empowering judges to exclude testimony when, in their view, the
proposed testimony represented nothing more than the unfounded belief
of the expert.110
Just how far the Court in Joiner intended to tip the balance was made
clear in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion. Justice Breyer noted that the
gatekeeper function assigned to judges by Daubert would “sometimes ask
judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific
methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks
to offer.”111 To Justice Breyer, judges were clearly empowered to make
scientific, as well as legal, determinations.112 Recognizing that judges are
not scientists, Justice Breyer urged that in complex cases, judges should
rely on court-appointed, neutral panels of experts to aid in making the
admissibility decision.113
106. Klein, supra note 102, at 1231 (“[By the time of the Daubert decision] Frye was already dead
on arrival at the Supreme Court. Thus, for the most part, Daubert simply represents the official death
certificate.”); see also infra Part III.C.
107. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
108. Id. at 140.
109. Id. at 146 (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992))
(emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 149-50.
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The second point that Joiner established—on the question that was
actually before the Court on appeal114—was that courts of appeals were
to apply an abuse of discretion standard when they reviewed trial courts’
decisions on the admissibility of expert witness testimony.115 This point
is important because it tips the balance even more toward trial judges.
Practically, the abuse of discretion standard means that the trial court
judge’s decision on admissibility will stand so long as he or she did not
issue a manifestly erroneous holding, which, as previously stated, is
extremely broad.116 After Joiner, evidentiary rulings that are appealed
are unlikely to be reversed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Plaintiffs thus get only one chance to present expert testimony.
Joiner’s analytical gap analysis is problematic in two interrelated ways.
First, asking trial judges to determine whether the gap between the data
and the expert’s opinion is to too wide risks substituting the trial judge’s
opinion for that of the expert. Except in very rare instances, there will not
be a single definitive study that directly establishes a causal relationship
between exposure to a substance and a physical harm;117 thus, in nearly
all cases, experts will need to draw an inference of causation. How far
such an inference may reach is an integral part of scientific expertise as
training in the sciences includes training in how much may be inferred
from the data, and the peer review process often carefully vets the extent
of authors’ inferences based on the data they have generated.118 Thus,
Joiner magnifies the concern raised in Justice Rehnquist’s Daubert
dissent that judges were now empowered to substitute their own ipse dixit
as to which inferences may be drawn from the scientific evidence in place
of those of the experts in the field.
This raises the second, related, problem created by Joiner: the Court
provided little guidance as to how judges are to decide when the analytic
gap is so great as to indicate that nothing but “the ispe dixit of the

114. Justice Stevens dissented from the part of the Joiner holding in which the Court created the
analytical gap analysis, arguing that the Court had an insufficient record on which to review the trial
court’s decision. Id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 141 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 141-42 (noting that under the abuse of discretion standard a trial court’s ruling will not
be overturned “unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous”).
117. Indeed, a skillful opponent can ensure that no study is sufficiently on point. For example, if a
substance has been shown to cause cancer in humans, that does not prove that it can cause a specific
cancer, such as leukemia. If it has been shown to cause leukemia, that does not prove it can cause AML,
a specific type of leukemia. If it has been shown to cause AML, that does not prove that it can cause APL,
a subtype of AML, and so on, potentially ad infinitum. This line of argument that causation had not been
proved was used by the defense in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.
Mass. 2009), and was critiqued by the plaintiff’s counsel in Steve B. Jensen, Sometimes Doubt Doesn’t
Sell: A Plaintiff’s Lawyer’s Perspective on Milward v. Acuity Products, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLICY
177, 184-86 (2013).
118. Id. at 180.
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expert”119 links the data and the opinion. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, the Court noted that “the law grants a district court the same
broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination.”120 Courts may apply the
“Daubert factors”121 to the methodology used by the expert to reach a
conclusion;122 they “must make certain that an expert . . . employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field.”123 And, courts can, under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, appoint experts to serve on behalf of the
court.124 Beyond this, the Supreme Court appears to have offered very
little guidance to trial judges in determining the admissibility of the
inferences and conclusions drawn by an expert witness.125
The Court completed its “revolution” with its 1999 Kumho decision.126
Kumho Tire manufactured a tire that had experienced a blow out,
resulting in a fatal traffic accident.127 The district court had ruled that the
plaintiff’s expert, whose testimony was based on technical knowledge—
as opposed to scientific knowledge, about which both Daubert and Joiner
were concerned—was inadmissible under a Daubert analysis.128 The
Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, ruling that the
Daubert gatekeeper function applied to testimony based on technical or
other specialized knowledge as well as on scientific knowledge.129 Thus,
the Daubert framework applies to all of the forms of expert witness
testimony covered by Rule 702.
The Court suggested a second important point in Kumho: courts might

119. 522 U.S. at 146.
120. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
121. These factors are (1) whether the theory is falsifiable, (2) whether it has been submitted for
peer review and publication, (3) whether a method has a known error rate and means of controlling the
technique’s operation, and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted. Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
122. 526 U.S. at 156.
123. Id. at 152.
124. FED. R. EVID. 706; 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J, concurring).
125. Two searches using WestlawNext were performed. The first filtered all Westlaw Citing
References to Joiner so as to return only Supreme Court cases. This returned eight cases, including
Kuhmo. Of the remaining seven, only two, Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), and Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), discussed Joiner, but not the issue of how judges should decide when an
expert’s conclusions are unreliable. The second search involved searching for all mentions of “General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner,” restricting the results to cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. This produced one
additional case, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 522 U.S. 379 (2008), in which the Court
held that the Tenth Circuit had erred by not applying the abuse of discretion standard in its review of the
district court’s evidentiary rulings.
126. 526 U.S. 137.
127. Id. at 142.
128. Id. at 145.
129. Id. at 147-48.
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narrow their construction of “qualified” when deciding whether an expert
would be allowed to testify.130 Under the Federal Rules, there are no
specific standards establishing when a proposed expert may be considered
a qualified expert. In Kumho, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion noted
that “[t]he trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had
sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors.”131 The Court
endorsed the trial court’s close examination of the expert’s
qualifications.132 Thus, Kumho suggested another way in which judges
might act as gatekeepers: by rejecting the testimony of a proffered expert
whose expertise is not highly specialized in the area in which the expert
would testify. The Court did not address this in detail and did not discuss
the apparent conflict of this narrowing of the definition of a qualified
expert with the permissive language of Rule 702.
B. Scholars’ Views of How Judges Are Using Their New Powers
Legal scholars have criticized judges’ handling of scientific evidence
and expert witnesses in the post-Daubert era. This criticism falls into two
general categories. In one category are claims that judges are rejecting
evidence based on misunderstandings of the statistical analyses contained
in scientific studies. In the other category are claims that judges are
rejecting evidence in order to arrive at certain case outcomes. These
claims posit that judges are knowingly rejecting valid science.
Numerous legal scholars have criticized the approaches that many trial
courts, post-Daubert, have taken to the scientific evidence on which
expert witnesses would rely.133 As one line of criticism stated, judges
“subject each item of expert proof proffered by plaintiffs to substantive
causation law scrutiny, to see if it, standing alone, would prove both
general and specific causation.”134 In essence, this criticism holds that
judges take the approach that only if an item, by itself, can prove causation
may it be admitted or serve as a basis for an expert’s opinion. This
“atomist” approach conflicts with the way in which scientists draw
130. Id. at 146-47 (noting that the Court granted certiorari “in light of uncertainty among the lower
courts” over the scope of qualifying knowledge).
131. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 153 (noting that the trial court examined the expert’s education, work experience, and
prior recognition as an expert witness in other cases).
133. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are
Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role To Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 33637 (1999); Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253 (2008); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse
Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2010); Steve C. Gold, A Fitting Vision of Science for the
Courtroom, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 1, 4-5 (2013).
134. Finley, supra note 133, at 336-37.
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inferences. Scientists typically use a “weight of the evidence” approach
in which they examine all of the available data, weighing each piece to
determine its relative value, and ultimately arrive at a conclusion.135 In
effect, judges using an atomist approach push the admissibility decision
back one step, making an admissibility decision on each piece of evidence
instead of allowing the expert to determine the weight of each piece in
order to draw an over-arching conclusion. Because this approach
excludes vastly more pieces of scientific evidence than the weight of the
evidence approach, fewer experts’ opinions have sufficient support to be
admissible.
Scholars have criticized several other ways that judges look at
scientific evidence. These scholars have pointed to an inappropriate
conflation of the burden of proof—the preponderance of the evidence—
with the admissibility standard of relevance.136 Many courts have ruled
that epidemiologic evidence, which shows how much more frequently
people exposed to a substance develop a disease than those who were not
exposed (the “relative risk”), is admissible only if those who were
exposed are at least twice as likely to develop the disease.137 In reality, a
less-than twofold increase in relative risk still may indicate that exposure
is associated with a higher likelihood of disease.138 Whether such a
finding deserves weight depends on the statistical significance, not on the
magnitude of the increase. Judges who apply a “relative risk 2.0”
standard do so because this seems to comport with the burden of proof in
a civil action: only when the relative risk is greater than 2.0 is it more
likely that any person who developed a disease did so because they were
exposed to the allegedly harmful substance. But nothing in the Federal
Rules or the Daubert trilogy indicates the preponderance of the evidence
standard was to be applied to individual pieces of scientific evidence.
Thus, judges who apply a relative risk 2.0 standard exclude valid
scientific evidence on which experts would rely outside the courtroom.
135. Id. at 337. This point was clearly made by Sir Austin Bradford Hill, who is regarded as the
father of modern epidemiology:
What I do not believe–and this has been suggested—is that we can usefully lay down some hardand-fast rules of evidence that must be observed before we accept cause and effect. None of my
nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against the cause and effect hypothesis and
none can be required as a sine qua non. What they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help
us to make up our minds on the fundamental question – is there any other way of explaining the
set of facts before us, is there any other answer equally, or more, likely than cause and effect?
Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation? 58 PROC. OF THE ROYAL
SOC’Y OF MED. 295, 299 (1965).
136. Finley, supra note 133, at 349.
137. See, e.g., In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1030
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[E]pidemiological evidence regarding the relationship between exposure to c and the
development of d may fall short of the 2.0 threshold of statistical significance.”).
138. Finley, supra note 133, at 348 & n.49.
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Other facets that have been criticized include the presumption that animal
studies are far less relevant the epidemiologic studies,139 a requirement
that the plaintiff precisely quantitate their exposure to the allegedly
harmful substance,140 and the misuse of sets of factors to be weighed as
lists of individual requirements that must be satisfied.141
Many legal scholars have gone beyond mere criticism of judges’
handling of the scientific aspects of the scientific evidence and the expert
witnesses and have looked at the effects of the admissibility decisions
judges have made since Daubert. Professor Lucinda Finley has argued
that by applying a stringent set of requirements—relative risk 2.0 and the
atomist approach included—judges “have been making profoundly
normative judgments about the social allocation of risk and who should
bear the burden of scientific uncertainty or controversy.”142 Finley claims
that the effect of placing a higher burden on plaintiffs is to have moved
away from using tort litigation to implement “consumer protective social
policies.”143 She sees this as having multiple social implications,
including having a disparate impact on groups whose health problems are
not robustly studied, thereby reducing the ability of litigation to spur
further scientific research and bringing a “premature sense of scientific
closure” to issues that merit further study.144 Professor Margaret Berger
has been even more blunt, stating that “according to some observers . . .
toxic tort law is being reformulated in the federal courts to the advantage
of defendants.”145
Implicit in these claims is that district court judges are acting on the
basis of policy or ideological positions. A substantial body of scholarship
suggests that partisanship accounts for a significant portion of judicial
decision making.146 However, most of this work has focused on the
appellate courts, with relatively little attention devoted to the district
courts. Studies of federal district court judges do show some influence of
partisanship, typically seen as a judge’s known party affiliation or based
on the party to which the President who appointed the judge belonged.147

139. See Berger, supra note 133 at 303.
140. Id. at 306-07.
141. See Haack, supra note 133 at 274-81.
142. Finley, supra note 133 at 335-36.
143. Id. at 336.
144. Id. at 338.
145. Berger, supra note 133 at 290.
146. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial
Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995).
147. See Lloyd, supra note 146 at 417-18 (finding that district court judges hold reapportionment
plans drawn by state legislatures controlled by the opposite party to a higher standard than plans drawn
by nonpartisan legislatures or those controlled by the judge’s party).
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These studies have tended to focus on ideologically-charged issues such
as legislative reapportionment. The Daubert trilogy was created during
an ideologically-charged moment as the perception that runaway
litigation and junk science were harming U.S. competitiveness was much
discussed in the courts, in politics, and in the popular media. Thus,
underlying claims by scholars such as Finley and Berger are an
assumption that the judicial imposition of stringent admissibility
standards is a manifestation of a political or ideological program of tilting
the litigation playing field in favor of corporate defendants. However, no
scholarly work has attempted to link individual judges’ political and
ideological leanings to their treatment of scientific evidence and expert
testimony, nor to changes in judicial behavior after the “Daubert
revolution.”
III. TOXIC TORT LITIGATION: THE CHOKE POINT OF GENERAL
CAUSATION
Toxic tort litigation offers an avenue by which to understand how much
of a change the Daubert trilogy has had on judicial evidentiary practices.
Toxic tort litigation involves a claim of injury resulting from exposure to
an allegedly harmful substance.148 The harms may be acute, as in the case
of illness arising immediately upon one’s inhalation of a noxious gas,149
but most commonly these actions concern harms that manifest years after
the initial exposure such as various cancers. Tort actions have deep,
historical roots, but toxic tort litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Although isolated toxic tort cases have been brought by plaintiffs who
became acutely ill upon exposure for over 150 years, the development of
the scientific tools and techniques that allow inferences of causation to be
drawn has been the engine that has driven modern toxic tort litigation.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a multidisciplinary
group of scientists developed epidemiology, the application of statistical
analysis to the occurrence of “disease or injury in human populations.”150
Epidemiologic studies can demonstrate a correlation showing that people
exposed to substance X are more likely to develop disease Y than are

148. L. NEAL ELLIS JR., INTRODUCTION, TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 3 (Arthur F. Foerster & Christine
Gregorski Rolph eds., 2d ed. 2013). “Substance” is typically defined capaciously, and so toxic tort cases
can involve X-rays, nuclear radiation, and other forms of energy. See, e.g., Cano v. Everest Minerals
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (toxic tort case involving claim that cancers resulted from
exposure to ionizing radiation).
149. See Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 90 Mass. 169 (1864) (alleging illness arising from defendant
gas company’s negligent release of gas).
150. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 286 (3d ed. 2011).
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people not exposed to X.151 The first major triumph of modern
epidemiologists was the correlation of cigarette smoking with lung
cancer, which was demonstrated by Richard Doll and Austin Bradford
Hill in a study published in 1950.152
But while epidemiologic studies can demonstrate a correlation, they
cannot prove that X actually causes Y, because there may be other,
unidentified factors that come along with X that are the true cause of Y.
Because of this, scientists have found it difficult to agree on how to infer
causation. This is especially important in the commonly litigated
situation where a substance allegedly causes a disease, but it takes years
for the disease to develop. Some scientists, including Bradford Hill,
argued in favor of using a “weight of the evidence” approach in this
situation, examining all of the available evidence but holding no single
part to be a necessary condition to establish causation.153 Others consider
the nine factors that Bradford Hill examined to be a checklist, with certain
elements—typically those looking at epidemiologic data to assess the
strength of the correlation between X and Y—to be necessary conditions,
without which one should not infer causation.154
In the 1950s and 1960s, scientists developed additional tools that have
become important for modern toxic tort litigation. Animal studies,
chemistry, biochemistry, and toxicology all developed into techniques
that permitted scientists to construct models that provide mechanistic
explanations of how some substances could harm humans.155
Plaintiffs in a toxic tort case must prove that they were exposed to the
allegedly harmful substance, that they suffered harm as the result of the
exposure, and, most importantly, that there is a causal relationship
between the exposure and the harm.156 Courts generally divide causation
into two distinct elements: general causation (i.e., the capacity of a
substance to cause the alleged harm in humans) and specific causation
(i.e., the fact that the substance caused the harm in the plaintiff).157 In
essence, the general causation inquiry asks “can it?” while the specific
151. Id. at 551-52.
152. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, 2(4682) BR. MED. J.
739 (1950).
153. See Hill, supra note 135. In his Royal Society address, Bradford Hill listed nine types of data
that scientists should consider when deciding whether X causes Y; he insisted that no one type was
dispositive.
154. Carl V. Phillips & Karen J. Goodman, The Missed Lessons of Sir Austin Bradford Hill, 1
EPIDEMIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATION *1, *2, http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/1/1/3
(noting that in epidemiology classes, Bradford Hill’s considerations are “[t]ypically presented as a
checklist approach to assessing causation”).
155. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 150, at 604-05.
156. ELLIS, supra note 148, at 4.
157. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 150, at 552; Alan Rudlin, Alexandra Cunningham &
Thomas R. Wascom, TOXIC TORT LITIGATION supra note 148, at 140-43.
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causation inquiry asks “did it?”
The necessity of proving causation creates an early opportunity for a
defendant to end a plaintiff’s case through an evidentiary challenge and a
motion for summary judgment.158 If the defendant can show that there is
no genuine dispute of material fact concerning its own expert witness’s
assertion that the defendant’s substance could not or did not cause the
plaintiff’s harm, it is entitled to summary dismissal of the case against
it.159
To prove general and specific causation in toxic tort cases, almost all
courts apply a rule that “expert . . . testimony is unquestionably required
to assist the jury.”160 Without a plaintiff’s expert to assert that substance
X may cause or has caused harm Y, a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment will almost certainly succeed.161
Under the generally accepted narrative, trial judges, who were once
mandated by the Frye rule to defer to the scientific community as to
whether scientific evidence and expert testimony based on that evidence
were admissible, now have the power to terminate cases at the evidentiary
challenge stage. Having been liberated by Daubert, judges may now
determine for themselves when evidence is reliable and relevant science,
and when an expert’s inferences attempt to cross too broad an analytical
gap in order to exclude a plaintiff’s expert witness testimony. Judges may
use the choke point of admissibility of plaintiffs’ causation experts to
dispose of cases based on their early perception of the merits of those
cases by excluding all of plaintiff’s causation experts. Further, judges
may use the choke point of admissibility of plaintiffs’ causation experts
to change the law in ways that reflect their own political or ideological
preferences.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Unfortunately, little empirical work has examined the factors that
actually drive judges’ admissibility rulings. This Part presents the results
of a pilot empirical study of federal district court rulings on challenges to
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
159. Id.
160. Junk v. Terminix Int'l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 450 (8th Cir. 2010 (quoting Ranes v. Adams Labs.,
Inc. 778 N.W.2d 677, 688 (Iowa 2010)); see also Korte v. Exxonmobil Coal USA, Inc., 164 F. App'x 553,
556 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Expert testimony is needed to establish causation in cases alleging an adverse health
effect when the ‘medical effects [of exposure to the toxin] are not within the ken of the ordinary person.’”)
(quoting Goffman v. Gross, 374 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1995); Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 791 F.
Supp 1335 (1992)). The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only outlier. See Gass v. Marriott Hotel Svcs.,
Inc., 558 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Plaintiffs are not required to produce expert testimony on causation
where Defendants have failed to offer scientific evidence regarding the effects of Demand CS or Suspend
SC.”).
161. See Berger, supra note 133, at 290.
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plaintiffs’ general causation experts, both before and after the Supreme
Court decisions that compose the Daubert trilogy. The first goal of the
study was to determine whether there actually was a “Daubert
revolution,” by asking whether judges’ dispositions of toxic tort cases at
the evidentiary challenge stage changed after the trilogy. The second goal
of the study was to identify the factors that sway judges’ rulings, in
particular those rulings that exclude all of a plaintiff’s general causation
experts, which effectively terminates plaintiffs’ cases.
A. Prior Empirical Work
A number of recent studies have empirically examined the impact of
the Daubert trilogy on admissibility decisions. Professors Andrew Jurs
and Scott DeVito used a database of several million cases that originated
in state courts to examine the rates at which civil defendants removed
cases from state to federal courts.162 By comparing removal rates from
state and federal courts before and after each adopted the Daubert
standard (or retained the Frye rule), Jurs and DeVito conclude that civil
defendants view Daubert as a stricter standard.163 Professors David M.
Flores, James T. Richardson, and Mara L. Merlino examined 191 cases in
the District of South Carolina; however, only 25 of these cases involved
challenges to the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert witnesses.164 They
found that post-Daubert, it was 4.69 times more likely that a defendant
would raise a challenge to a plaintiff’s expert witness.165 Of the 25 cases
involving a challenge to a plaintiff’s expert, all but six settled, leaving too
small a data set to compare outcomes before and after Daubert.166 Neither
study specifically examined the actual practices of federal judges. Jurs
and DeVito focused mainly on defendants’ perceptions of the relative
stringency of the Frye and Daubert standards.167 Their findings would
tend to support the conventional narrative that Daubert allowed judges to
exclude more expert testimony and scientific evidence.168 Flores,
Richardson, and Merlino’s study also suggests that defendants view
Daubert as having raised the bar to admissibility, since defendants post162. Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s
Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (2013).
163. Id. at 680.
164. David M. Flores, James T. Richardson & Mara L. Merlino, Examining the Effects of the
Daubert Trilogy on Expert Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 533 (2009).
165. Id. at 555.
166. See id. at 560.
167. Jurs & DeVito, supra note 162, at 678-79.
168. See id. at 680 (finding that defendants preferred the Daubert rule to the Frye rule because it led
to more frequent exclusion of plaintiffs’ experts).
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Daubert have acted as though judges are more likely to exclude plaintiff’s
expert witnesses.169
Unlike these prior studies, the current study discussed in this Article
directly examines judges’ evidentiary rulings.
By limiting the
examination to toxic tort cases, this study seeks to explore more directly
not only the impact that the Daubert trilogy has had on the number of
cases disposed of at the evidentiary challenge stage, but also the factors
that underlie evidentiary decisions both before and after Daubert.
B. Methods
Using the West database accessed through WestlawNext and
employing a variety of search terms, I assembled a set of fifty-seven
federal court decisions170 on challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs’
general causation experts in toxic tort cases. Twenty-six of these
decisions were rendered before Daubert and thirty-one after Daubert.
The primary endpoint assessed in this study is the outcome of a
defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of a plaintiff’s general
causation experts. Court opinions were read carefully to identify the
challenged experts who would give testimony on general causation. The
number of proffered general causation experts under challenge and the
number whose testimony was admitted were recorded. For analytical
purposes, a dummy variable was assigned, with “1” assigned to decisions
admitting any or all of a plaintiff’s general causation experts and “0”
assigned to decisions admitting none of a plaintiff’s general causation
experts. A secondary endpoint was the judge’s ruling on a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment if a motion was made at the same time.
Cases summarily disposed of at this stage were coded as “1,” while cases
that survived were coded as “0.”
To determine which, if any, factors were correlated with judges’
admissibility rulings, I identified three potential areas of investigation.
First was whether judges may have been ruling on the basis of fairly
obvious weaknesses in the plaintiffs’ cases. If judges are truly as
concerned about the impact of expert witness testimony on juries as they
have indicated,171 they might use the choke point of general causation as
169. See Flores, Richardson & Merlino, supra note 164, at 554 (finding a large increase in
defendants’ challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs’ experts following the Daubert decision).
170. The focus of this Article is on federal district court practices, so the majority of the cases in
this database are from the district court level. However, five appellate court decisions are included where
no published opinion of the district court ruling under review was available. The criteria for including
appellate court opinions were that they contain sufficient information about the underlying case and the
district judge’s stated reasons for admitting or excluding the proffered expert witness testimony that the
factors under evaluation in this study could be coded.
171. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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a means of preventing cases they perceive as meritless from getting to a
jury, as previously discussed supra. Second was whether judges’ own
ideology or judicial experience informed their decision making. And
third was whether judges might use a plaintiff’s ability to present more
than a single general causation expert as a proxy for the merits of the case.
To evaluate the potential impact of overt factual weaknesses in
plaintiffs’ cases on judges’ admissibility rulings, I used a set of five
factors that I call “adverse case characteristics.” These factors were
identified based on analysis of the first fifteen cases added to the database
(most of which were decided in the post-Daubert era). The factors were
then applied to the entire database. The five factors are:
(1) Failure of the plaintiff to identify a specific harm that they
suffered. Plaintiffs in many toxic tort cases allege specific harms,
such as leukemia172 or asthma.173 The allegation of a specific harm
permits the finder of fact to evaluate the likelihood that the
defendant’s substance caused that harm.
There are two
circumstances where such an evaluation may be so difficult as to
make it impossible to meet the legal standard of causation. In the
first, a plaintiff may allege multiple vague or nonspecific
complaints. One example is the combination of sinusitis, toxic
encephalopathy, small airways disease, and dysosmia;174 another is
a combination of fatigue and difficulty concentrating. In the second
circumstance, multiple plaintiffs may each allege a single, distinct
harm, but each may allege a different harm.175 Not only do these
two kinds of cases make legal determinations difficult, but the broad
nature of the alleged harms begs the question of whether any single
specific cause can ever be identified, and why the particular
defendant should be held liable.
(2) Failure of a plaintiff to specify the substance responsible for the
alleged injury. Many toxic tort plaintiffs specify that they were
harmed by a single substance such as benzene176 or the insecticide
chlorpyrifos.177 Others, however, allege that they were exposed to
unspecified chemicals contained in a toxic soup on the grounds of a
rail yard178 or to multiple chemicals in hundreds of fragrances.179
Again, the difficulties in establishing causation where the causative
172. Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
173. Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc, 936 F. Supp. 900 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
174. Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
175. Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 363 F. Supp.2d 859 (N.D. Miss. 2005) (one plaintiff
alleging Hodgkin’s lymphoma and the other bladder cancer).
176. Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp.2d 865 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
177. Pritchard v. Dow Agro Sciences, 705 F. Supp.2d 471 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
178. Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 371 F. Supp.2d 702 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
179. Sanderson, 950 F. Supp. at 981.
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agent is not identified weaken the plaintiff’s claims against a specific
defendant.
(3) Failure of the plaintiff to state a believable timeline linking the
exposure to the defendant’s substance to the alleged harm. A
plaintiff who alleges that a worsening of his asthma nearly ten years
after a single exposure to a chemical,180 and one who alleges the
development of widely-metastatic cancer of a slowly-growing type
within a year of exposure,181 both present facially questionable
claims.
(4) Failure of a plaintiff to state a believable level of exposure to the
allegedly harmful substance. A plaintiff who alleges that her child’s
congenital defects were due to airborne chemicals released from an
explosion at a manufacturing plant several miles away, to which she
was exposed for less than ten minutes,182 presents an immediately
questionable claim.
(5) Cases in which other courts have already closely examined either
the proposed causal mechanisms to which the plaintiff’s experts
would testify or the qualifications of the plaintiff’s experts and found
them to be wanting.
This set of factors was designed to examine whether a “commonsense”
look at a plaintiff’s case correlates with admissibility rulings. The
presence of one or more of these adverse case characteristics was coded
as a “1,” and the absence of all five was coded as “0.”
To evaluate the potential impact of judges’ characteristics, the political
party to which the president who appointed the judge rendering the
opinion, and the number of years that the judge had been on the bench at
time he or she rendered the opinion, were recorded. For the analysis of
party effect, judges appointed by a Democratic president were coded as
“0” and those appointed by a Republican president were coded as “1.”
For analysis of the impact of duration of federal judicial service, judges
with less than ten years on the federal bench were coded as “0” and with
ten or more years as “1.” This resulted in nearly equal sized cohorts.
To evaluate the potential impact of plaintiffs’ experts, the study used a
simple quantification: plaintiffs who proffered only a single general
causation expert were coded as “0,” while those who proffered more than
one general causation expert were coded as “1.”
Statistical analyses were performed using two freely available online

180. O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp 1376 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
181. Peterson v. Sealed Air Corp., 1990 WL 186779 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
182. Boyles ex rel. Boyles v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 796 F. Supp. 704 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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calculators.183 Simple comparisons were examined using Chi-squared
tests, while a multiple logistic regression analysis was used to determine
the independence of the effects of the examined factors. A p-value of
0.05 was considered to be significant.
C. Findings
The fifty-seven rulings in the data set were issued between April of
1963, and January of 2014. Other than Roberts v. Union Carbide Co., the
1963 case, the pre-Daubert cases were clustered between 1985 and 1992.
Thus, this group of cases predominantly represent the era of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The post-Daubert cases were weighted slightly
toward the past fifteen years. Thus, these cases reflect both the period
during which the “Daubert trilogy” was being developed and the more
recent period during which no major legislative or Supreme Court
changes to the admissibility doctrine were made.
The analysis of this data yields three significant findings, two of which
challenge the conventional narrative.
First, judges before and after Daubert excluded plaintiffs’ expert
witness testimony and granted motions for summary judgment at nearly
the same rate. Thus, the narrative’s tale of a progression from judges
having minimal power over the admissibility of experts to judges having
nearly unfettered power does not describe the reality of toxic tort litigation
in the federal courts.
Second, when judges are presented with multiple general causation
experts by a plaintiff, they very frequently admit or exclude all of the
experts. Likewise, when experts seek to rely on multiple scientific
studies, judges tend to admit or exclude the studies in an all-or-nothing
fashion. A close examination of some of the cases in which judges
excluded all studies relied upon by a plaintiff’s experts suggests that the
admissibility rulings were not based on the evidentiary rules that applied
at that time. Thus, the conventional narrative is correct that judges decide
on the admissibility of expert testimony and scientific studies on the basis
of factors other than general acceptance (under Frye), or reliability and
relevance (under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert trilogy).
Lastly, before Daubert, judges were excluding plaintiffs’ experts and
thus disposing of cases based on perceived superficial weaknesses in the
plaintiffs’ overall cases. However, after Daubert, neither superficial
weaknesses, the ability of the plaintiff to obtain expert testimony, nor
judges’ political orientation appear to correlate with their decisions.
183. John C. Pezzulo, Logistic Regression, http://statpages.org/logistic.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2014); P. Wessa, Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development and Education, version
1.1.23-r7, http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_multipleregression.wasp/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
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All of these findings are discussed in greater detail below.
1.

Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Experts and Grants of Summary Judgment
Before and After Daubert

The conventional narrative maintains that before Daubert, judges
admitted nearly all proffered expert testimony, and that after Daubert,
judges excluded far more expert testimony. This study, however, refutes
the story of overly-permissive admissibility before Daubert. Before
Daubert, judges excluded all of a given plaintiff’s general causation
experts in 72 percent of cases. The analysis also refutes the story of
drastic change following Daubert. Post-Daubert, judges excluded all of
a plaintiff’s general causation experts in 81 percent of cases. This
difference is not statistically significant.184
Other comparisons also suggest that little has changed in the pattern of
judicial rulings on the admissibility of plaintiffs’ general causation
experts. Because proving general causation is a choke point in toxic tort
litigation,185 when a judge excludes all of the plaintiff’s general causation
experts, the case may be terminated by a grant of summary judgment.
Before and after Daubert, judges granted motions for summary judgment
made along with challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs’ general
causation experts in 89 and 85 percent of cases, respectively. Since not
all rulings on defendants’ challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs’
general causation experts also ruled on motions for summary judgment,
grants of defendants’ motions of summary judgment resulted in
termination of 68 percent of all examined cases before Daubert and 55
percent after Daubert.186 Again, the difference is not statistically
significant.
At this level of analysis, very little has changed since Daubert.
Establishing general causation continues to be a major choke point in
toxic tort litigation, with judges’ exclusion of plaintiffs’ general causation
experts still effectively terminating over half of all cases. The high rate
of exclusion of expert witness testimony before Daubert highlights the
unreliability of self-reported data and the assumptions of commentators.
And the absence of a significant change in the rate of exclusion before
and after Daubert shows that claims of Daubert’s revolutionary impact
are vastly overstated.

184. p = 0.47.
185. See supra Part II.
186. p = 0.31.
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2. All-or-Nothing Behavior in Admissibility Rulings
Under Frye, the judge’s process was supposed to be fairly mechanical
and limited to determining whether a theory or a scientific study was
generally accepted. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges were to
determine whether theories or studies were relevant and reliable, although
it was unclear whether general acceptance was still required. Under
Daubert, it was clear that general acceptance was only one among many
factors a court could use to determine relevance and reliability. Under all
of these approaches, each theory, methodology, or study that an expert
cited should have been evaluated independently.
A reasonable
expectation is that where an expert cites multiple studies as forming the
basis of their opinion, some of those studies would be excluded and some
admitted. Under the Federal Rules and the Joiner decision, the reliability
of the expert’s inferences drawn from the admitted materials would be
assessed. The likely outcome of such a process is that some but not all
studies would be admitted and some but not all experts would be admitted.
Not that this would happen in every case. Some cases might be so weak
that experts could do little more than present largely irrelevant scientific
studies and draw unsupported inferences from them. In these cases,
judges should exclude all of the cited studies and all of the proffered
experts. In some particularly strong cases, experts could rely on any
number of relevant and reliable studies to draw well-supported inferences.
In these cases, judges should admit all of the cited studies and all of the
proffered experts. But particularly where experts seek to use a large
number of studies or where plaintiffs proffer multiple general causation
experts, judges who apply the rules would likely demonstrate selectivity,
admitting some but not all studies and experts in many cases.
To determine whether judges were being selective, and whether, as the
conventional narrative would suggest, they became more selective once
they had the tools Daubert supposedly gave them, this study examined a
smaller subset of cases in which judges ruled on challenges to more than
one proffered general causation expert or on more than one scientific
study upon which an expert sought to base an opinion.
Before Daubert, judges admitted some and rejected other plaintiffs’
general causation experts in only 14 percent of cases. After Daubert, the
number remained low—20 percent. In all of the other cases—86 percent
and 80 percent before and after Daubert, respectively—judges either
admitted all or excluded all of the proffered general causation experts.
Thus, it does not appear that judges became more selective in their
admissibility decisions on plaintiffs’ experts in the aftermath of Daubert.
Because this frequent all-or-nothing response to multiple proffered
experts and scientific studies is inconsistent with the selective approach
called for under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert
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framework, it seems likely that judges’ decision-making process in postDaubert cases is based on factors other than reliability and relevance. It
is, however, also possible that a large majority of toxic tort cases are
meritless, and that the plaintiffs’ experts in these cases proffer only
irrelevant scientific studies and draw only unsupported inferences based
on those studies. Judges would thus have no choice but to engage in an
all-or-nothing exclusion pattern based on the analysis mandated by the
Federal Rules and Daubert. However, the cases in this data set provide
evidence that refutes this contention.
Using the adverse case
characteristics described above as a marker for overtly weak cases, it is
possible to examine whether plaintiffs presenting superficially weaker
cases have difficulty engaging general causation experts. Plaintiffs
presenting superficially strong cases—those with no adverse case
characteristics—proffered more than one general causation expert in 52
percent of cases, while those presenting superficially weaker cases—
those with at least one adverse case characteristic—proffered more than
one general causation expert in an identical 52 percent of cases. Thus, the
apparent strength of a plaintiff’s case does not appear to impact the
number of experts they can engage. While this only indirectly addresses
the contention that weak cases force plaintiffs’ experts to rely on
irrelevant studies and to draw unsupported inferences, the fact that
plaintiffs presenting relatively stronger or weaker cases can proffer the
same number of experts187 suggests that, to the relevant community of
experts, there is similar scientific merit in the claims of both groups of
plaintiffs.
Further, a close reading of cases in which a judge excluded all of the
studies on which a plaintiff’s general causation expert sought to rely
shows judges using mechanisms that suggest their admissibility rulings
are results oriented and based on considerations other than the legal rules.
For example, in Smith v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., decided two years
before Daubert, the district court barred the plaintiff’s two experts on
causation from testifying, holding that although the experts were both
qualified under Rule 702, their proposed testimony was not based on
reliable evidence.188 The experts had formulated their opinions—that
nonoxynol-9, the active ingredient in Ortho’s spermicide, was capable of
causing trisomy 18, a genetic defect—based in large part on four
published scientific studies.189
In that case, the court treated scientific evidence in several ways that
187. Plaintiffs in cases with no adverse case characteristics proffered an average of 2.2 general
causation experts, while those in cases with at least one adverse case characteristic proffered an average
of 2.0 general causation experts (p = 0.32).
188. Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
189. Id. at 1576-80.
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legal scholars have criticized.190 First, the court overstated the import of
empirical studies that failed to show a correlation between exposure and
disease when it stated that “[i]f the statistical likelihood is negligible, it
establishes a reasonable degree of medical certainty that there is no causeand-effect relationship absent some other evidence.”191 By ignoring the
crucial issue of whether negative studies had included large enough
groups to have statistical significance, the court incorrectly interpreted a
study that fails to provide evidence of causation as proving the absence of
causation. Second, the judge rejected one study that showed a greaterthan-threefold increase in risk of another genetic duplication, trisomy 21
(which causes Down’s Syndrome), because the study did not address
trisomy 18 (the plaintiff’s condition).192 In essence, the court took an
“atomistic” approach, requiring plaintiff’s experts to base their opinion
on a single study that directly proves causation rather than multiple
studies that collectively supported the expert’s opinion. This is the
opposite of what scientists do in practice, which is to synthesize all of the
available data using a “weight of the evidence” approach. Thus, the judge
imposed a judicially determined analytical process on scientific experts.
Finally, the court rejected one study because the authors stated that “the
results suggest no more than a ‘tentative confirmation of a link.’”193
Again, this represents an atomistic approach to the available evidence
and, if widely applied, would lead courts to reject almost any study since
scientists’ reluctance to pronounce any study definitive leads the insertion
of such boilerplate disclaimers into most published studies. Most
importantly, this case shows a court applying the all-or-nothing approach.
Ultimately, it appears that the court placed dispositive weight on the
fact that the FDA had examined the safety of nonoxynol-9 on two
occasions and on both had determined that “the weight of the present
evidence does not support an association between the use of spermicides
and birth defects.”194 But the FDA’s findings should affect the weight
accorded to the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony, not the admissibility of that
testimony. The weight afforded to the evidence should be a question for
a jury. Judge Ward did not comment on the irony of his endorsement of
the FDA’s use of a weight-of-the-evidence analysis while applying an
atomistic approach to the plaintiff’s weight-of-the-evidence analysis.
This disparate treatment of the analysis on which the court based its
decision and the analysis of the expert whose testimony it rejected
190. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
191. Smith, 770 F. Supp. at 1576.
192. Id. at 1581.
193. Id. at 1578.
194. Id. at 1563-64. The court did not comment on the irony of its endorsement of the FDA’s use
of a weight-of-the-evidence approach, while applying an atomistic approach of the plaintiff’s evidence.
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provides further support for the argument that the judge’s decision on
admissibility was actually a results-oriented ruling made by means of an
evidentiary ruling.
Based on the findings that judges frequently admit or exclude scientific
evidence and plaintiffs’ general causation experts in an all-or-nothing
fashion and that judges appear to consider factors other than reliability
and relevance in their admissibility decisions, part of the conventional
narrative appears to be possibly correct: judges do appear to be using
admissibility rulings to reach certain goals.
3. Non-Evidentiary Factors Underlying Judges’ Admissibility Rulings
If the explanation for judges’ all-or-nothing admissibility decisions lies
beyond the application of the rules of evidence, this raises an obvious
question: what factors other than the relevance and reliability of scientific
theories and studies and experts’ inferences are judges considering? This
study examined three possible factors. The only significant correlation
was between certain, easily determined, characteristics of weak cases and
the exclusion of all of a plaintiff’s general causation experts; this
correlation was present only in the pre-Daubert cases. Two other potential
factors—judges’ ideology and experience and judges’ use of the number
of plaintiffs’ experts as a proxy for the merits of the cases—did not appear
to be significantly correlated with judges’ evidentiary rulings.
a. Characteristics of Cases
Certain factual weaknesses of plaintiff’s toxic tort case may be readily
apparent, even before either side’s experts have testified. As described
above, this study considered any of the following features to be a
weakness that would be readily apparent to a judge at the time of an
evidentiary challenge: failure to identify a specific harm, failure to
identify a specific substance that caused the alleged harm, failure to
describe a timeline relating the exposure to the harm that is consistent
with commonly known facts, failure to allege a level of exposure that
could believably result in the harm alleged, and prior courts’ adverse
evaluations of the causal mechanisms espoused by and the qualifications
possessed by the plaintiff’s general causation experts. The study
considered the presence of any one of these five features to mark a case
as possessing “adverse case characteristics.”
Adverse case characteristics were present in 79 percent of cases before
Daubert and 42 percent after Daubert.195 This statistically significant
195. p = 0.005.
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decrease resulted mainly from a clustering of adverse case characteristics
in a small number of post-Daubert claims, such that these claims
contained two or more adverse characteristics. This clustering was
unusual in the pre-Daubert cases. Thus, cases brought in the postDaubert period tended to be either strong (having no adverse
characteristics) or very weak (having two or more adverse
characteristics).
Judges’ admissibility rulings in the pre-Daubert era exhibited a very
strong correlation with the presence of any adverse case characteristics.
In cases with any adverse characteristic, judges were highly likely to
exclude all of a given plaintiff’s general causation experts, doing so in 89
percent of cases. In contrast, in cases with no adverse characteristics,
judges excluded all of plaintiff’s general causation experts in only 29
percent.196 Thus, cases that exhibited any adverse characteristic were far
less likely to survive beyond a challenge to the admissibility of the
plaintiff’s general causation experts.
Analysis of the post-Daubert cases reveals a strikingly different
pattern. In this group, judges ruling on cases with or without any adverse
characteristics excluded all of the plaintiff’s general causation experts in
84 and 79 percent of cases, respectively.197 Thus, in the post-Daubert era,
judges no longer appear to be deciding to exclude all of a plaintiff’s
general causation experts based on their perceptions of the overall merits
of the cases. This change is particularly striking in light of the finding
that cases in the post-Daubert era tended to be more distinctly strong or
weak, even at the stage at which challenges to expert witnesses arise.
The conventional narrative is partially consistent with the finding that
pre-Daubert judges were rendering admissibility rulings in an apparent
attempt to prevent weak cases from going to the jury. Judges and
commentators have long voiced concerns about the excessive influence
that apparently infallible scientific experts may have on lay juries.198 PreDaubert judges’ admissibility decisions based on superficial case
weaknesses may reflect such a distrust of juries’ abilities to properly
weigh expert witness testimony; judges were likely preventing weak
cases from ever reaching the jury where convincing scientific testimony
could confuse the jury into ruling for the weaker side.
But other parts of the conventional narrative about judges’ worries
about the effect of apparently infallible experts appear to have been
wrong. It appears that all along judges had the upper hand. The preDaubert cases examined in this study suggest that in the Frye and FRCP
eras, judges could control case outcomes by excluding all of a plaintiff’s
196. p = 0.006.
197. p = 0.64.
198. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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scientific evidence and expert testimony on general causation.
The conventional narrative appears to be largely incorrect in the postDaubert era as well. Although high, the rate at which judges excluded
scientific evidence and expert testimony was unchanged. Hence, Daubert
does not appear to have effected a revolutionary expansion in judges’
ability to exclude evidence and experts. But something has indeed
changed. The adverse case characteristics, which reflect a commonsense
understanding of cases’ weaknesses, no longer correlate with the
exclusion of all of plaintiffs’ expert testimony post-Daubert. Rather,
Daubert appears to have freed federal judges to dispose of cases based on
other considerations. The remainder of this study examined some
possible considerations that are used by judges.
b. Judges’ Political Views and Judicial Experience
A substantial body of scholarship suggests that partisanship accounts
for a significant portion of judicial decision making.199 Most of this work
has focused on the appellate courts, with relatively little attention devoted
to the district courts. Studies of federal district court judges do support
some influence of partisanship, typically defined as a judge’s known party
affiliation or based on the party to which the President who appointed the
judge belonged.200 These studies have examined decisions on politicallycharged topics such as legislative reapportionment.201
As discussed above, although admissibility rulings may seem far
removed from these kinds of politically charged issues, toxic tort cases do
contain a large political dimension. Many cases have the potential to
impose large costs on corporate defendants, and all toxic tort cases raise
the question of the appropriate—or, depending one’s ideology, the
efficient—allocation of risk and cost. Thus, judges’ political and
ideological preferences are reasonable factors to investigate in trying to
ascertain what is driving their admissibility decisions.
In this study, party affiliation had no significant effect on judges’
admissibility decisions. Judges’ party affiliation was determined by the
party to which the president who appointed the judge belonged. Judges
appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents excluded all of a
given plaintiff’s general causation experts in 82 and 74 percent of cases,

199. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial
Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995)
200. See Lloyd, supra note 199, at 417-18 (finding that district court judges hold reapportionment
plans drawn by state legislatures controlled by the opposite party to a higher standard than plans drawn
by nonpartisan legislatures or those controlled by the same party).
201. See id.
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respectively.202 When decisions were stratified by whether they were
rendered before and after Daubert, there were still no statistically
significant differences related to party affiliation, although, before
Daubert, judges appointed by Democratic or Republican Presidents
excluded all of a given plaintiff’s general causation experts in 83 and 68
percent of cases, respectively.203 Neither of these differences was
statistically significant, indicating that party affiliation did not influence
judges admissibility decisions either before or after Daubert.
This finding argues against the claims of some legal scholars that
judges’ admissibility decisions have become based on politics and
ideology, and specifically counters the argument that judges have used
their Daubert-conferred gatekeeper powers to tilt the playing field in
favor of corporate defendants. Although using the party affiliation of the
President who appointed a judge as a proxy for the judge’s ideology is
imperfect, the analysis does not support the arguments made by scholars
such as Lucinda Finley and Margaret Berger that there has been a strong
post-Daubert shift in toxic tort litigation motivated by a desire to move
away from “consumer protective social policies” toward more
corporation-protecting policies.204 Rather, the study can be interpreted as
showing that such attitudes had been present—and were being
implemented—well before Daubert.
The study also postulated that the length of time a judge had spent on
the federal district court bench might influence the judge’s admissibility
practices. Specifically, the study asked whether less experienced judges
might be more or less inclined to admit testimony and might feel more or
less pressure to shrink their dockets. The study hypothesized that judges
with fewer years on the bench are more likely to admit plaintiffs’ general
causation experts.
However, the study concluded that the length of time a judge had spent
on the federal district court bench also had no impact on their
admissibility decisions. Judges with less than ten years of experience—a
threshold which was chosen to divide the judges into to two nearly-even
sized groups—excluded all plaintiffs’ general causation experts in 78
percent of cases, while judges with ten or more years of experience
excluded all plaintiffs’ general causation experts in 77 percent of cases.
Setting the dividing line at five years of experience also failed to yield a
significant difference.205
202. p = 0.41.
203. p = 0.46.
204. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
205. Judges with five or fewer years of experience excluded all plaintiffs’ general causation experts
in 64 percent of cases, while judges with more than five years of experience excluded all plaintiffs’ general
causation experts in 80 percent of cases (p = 0.23 using a two-tailed analysis).
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Thus, neither political affiliation nor federal judicial experience
appears to correlate with judges’ admissibility rulings.
c. The Number of Plaintiffs’ General Causation Experts
Judges evaluating the merits of a case might also use the number of
proffered general causation experts as a proxy for the strength or
weakness of a plaintiff’s case. laintiffs whose claims were weak because
there was little reason to believe the substance to which they were
exposed could cause the harm might be able to find fewer general
causation experts to testify in their behalf. Courts and commentators have
claimed that under Frye, judges used the number of experts as a proxy for
the merits of a case, and criticized this practice “because of the importance
it places on the judge's subjective ability to ‘count heads’ among experts
in the scientific community.”206
In the toxic tort cases included in this study’s database, “counting
heads” did not seem to be a common occurrence. Looking at the number
of general causation experts proffered by the plaintiffs, that number did
not correlate with judges’ decisions to exclude all of the plaintiffs’ general
causation experts. Plaintiffs who had at least one general causation expert
admitted to testify had proffered an average of 2.4 experts, while those
whose general causation experts were all excluded had proffered an
average of 2.0 experts, a difference that is not statistically significant.207
Dividing opinions into those issued before and after Daubert shows the
same nonsignificant difference in each group.208
Admittedly, this quantitative analysis does not fully address the
“counting heads” argument because that argument assumes that judges
count the heads on both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s sides.
Unfortunately, evidentiary rulings often address only the plaintiffs’
experts since most often it is the defendant who raises the challenge. Thus,
the number of defendants’ general causation experts often cannot be
determined by reading the judges’ rulings.
This analysis does, however, tend to refute the theory that judges use
the number of a plaintiff’s general causation experts as a proxy for the
strength of the case and then base their admissibility rulings off the
number of experts presented by the plaintiff.

206. Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (11th Cir. 1984).
207. p = 0.26 (using a one-tailed test, assuming a unidirectional response).
208. Prior to Daubert, plaintiffs in this study who had at least one expert admitted to testify had
proferred a mean of 2.6 experts, and plaintiffs who had no experts admitted had proferred a mean of 2.2
experts. The p value was 0.7. After Daubert, the mean number of experts proferred was 2.2 and 1.9,
respectively. The p value was .66.
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V. REVISING THE NARRATIVE
As the analysis in Part I shows, the conventional narrative of the rules
governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony and scientific
evidence is largely incomplete. The data from the empirical study
presented in this Article suggests that the conventional narrative is also
incorrect in several respects. This Part proposes a new narrative that is
both more consistent with the data and more complete in the hope of
explaining what federal judges are actually doing when they make rulings
at the evidentiary challenge stage of toxic tort cases.
The new narrative begins before Daubert, when judges excluded
plaintiffs’ general causation experts in the vast majority of cases.
Whether deciding under the Frye general acceptance test or under the
relevance and reliability requirements of Rule 702, judges were actually
using their rulings on challenges to the admissibility of plaintiffs’ experts
to dispose of superficially weak cases. Presumably, these judges were
deeply cynical about juries’ abilities to weigh the testimony of apparently
infallible scientific experts. But, even if cynicism about juries’ abilities
was not the reason, judges clearly held the upper hand and firmly
controlled which experts were admitted to testify in toxic tort cases.
The impact of the Daubert trilogy has been negligible in at least one
way: judges have excluded plaintiffs’ expert witnesses and disposed of
plaintiffs’ cases at nearly the same rate after the trilogy as they did before
Daubert and its trilogy. Thus, from a plaintiff’s perspective, little has
changed. However, the trilogy has been revolutionary in other ways.
Judges are no longer excluding experts and disposing of cases on the basis
of superficial weaknesses. Further, judges do not seem to be acting in
pursuit of political or ideological ends. At this time, although the data
suggests that some of the motivations that other scholars have proposed
are not correct, the judges’ motivations remain unknown.
This new narrative suggests some promising areas for future study by
scholars interested in understanding judges’ actual practices. The
ascendance of the law and economics movement has occurred over the
same time period that this study covers. Although analysis of judges’
party affiliation did not detect an effect on their admissibility rulings, it
may be fruitful to examine whether judges’ embrace of economic analysis
correlates with those rulings. Also, it may be beneficial to examine
whether judges’ dispositions of toxic tort cases reflected a concern with
the efficient allocation of costs; this might be studied by correlating the
potential economic impact of an adverse outcome on the defendant
(would it affect only the defendant, or an entire industry) and on the
plaintiff (would it affect an individual plaintiff, or an entire class) with the
judge’s evidentiary ruling.
Another potentially promising area of future research is whether judges
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post-Daubert are using characteristics of experts as proxies for the merits
of plaintiffs’ cases. In Kumho, Justice Breyer seemed to suggest that
judges should make their criteria for qualifying experts more stringent.209
Although this study did not detect an impact of the number of general
causation experts a plaintiff proposed, judges may be looking at the
relative number of general causation experts put forth by each side, or
they may be looking more closely at the qualifications of each expert.
Thus, judges may be using factors such as an expert’s publication record
or the “fit” between the expert’s field of expertise and the subject of the
testimony the expert proposes to give in order to determine the strength
of a plaintiff’s case.
How we understand contemporary judges’ behavior—and hence the
impact of the Daubert trilogy—might depend on whether we focus on
process or on outcome. If what we focus on is outcome, what we really
want is to know whether or not toxic tort suits are disposed of correctly
(assuming that a “correct” disposition can objectively be determined); this
study can provide only a partial answer. Judges are now disposing of
some cases that lack obvious weaknesses for reasons that are not clear. It
is possible that an examination of other factors, such as the relative degree
of specialized expertise possessed by each sides’ experts or the economic
impact of a judgment against one side or the other will suggest judges’
underlying motivations. But whatever these motivations are—and even
if judges are simply “following the rules”—the current outcomes are
undesirable because cases asserting colorable claims are being disposed
of based on the pretense of a failure to establish general causation.
Conversely, judges are now allowing a similar percentage of facially
weak cases to go to the jury, even though there is a long history of judges
stating concerns that experts’ apparent infallibility may corrupt the
decision making of lay jurors. Thus, from a results-oriented perspective,
the answer to the question of how we judge the current behavior is with
at least partial disapproval. Ultimately, though, if we are concerned with
outcomes, we need empirical evidence on the societal impact of judges’
admissibility decisions in toxic tort cases.
If, however, we are more concerned with process—whether judges are
following the rules—this study shows that the answer is that judges did
not appear to be following the rules before Daubert and they do not appear
to have been following the (new) rules after Daubert. Before Daubert,
judges were disposing of cases at the general causation admissibility stage
based on overt weaknesses not tied to general causation. But what about
contemporary judges’ behavior? Again, the specific answer to the
question about the bases for judges’ admissibility rulings is unclear based
209. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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on this study, but it is likely that judges are not simply applying the rules
as set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert trilogy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the accepted narrative about the admissibility
of expert witness testimony is nuanced and, in many particulars, incorrect.
The Daubert revolution was in part a non-event. At least in the world of
toxic tort litigation, Frye was already dead when Daubert was decided,
and Daubert simply gave judges a little more flexibility to do what they
were already doing—excluding most experts proffered by plaintiffs. In
terms of overall case dispositions at the evidentiary challenge stage, very
little has changed: similar numbers of cases are terminated by a
defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ general
causation experts. But there has been a revolutionary change as well:
federal judges appear to be deciding cases in the post-Daubert era on the
basis of a very different set of considerations. This study suggests that
while, before Daubert, judges used the evidentiary challenge stage as
means of disposing of superficially weak cases, after Daubert, this is no
longer the case. Further empirical research is needed help to understand
the practices of contemporary judges, and thus to fully evaluate the impact
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert trilogy, but the study
presented in this Article provides a strong foundation for future empirical
studies.
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